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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHASTA

FRIENDS OF THE RIVER;
GOLDEN GATE SALMON ASSOCIATION;
PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION OF
FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATIONS;
INSTITUTE FOR FISHERIES RESOURCES;
SIERRA CLUB;
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE; and
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
District and Datitionars
Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
V.
WESTLANDS WATER DISTRICT; and
DOES 1-20,
Defendants and Respondents.

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTION OF COMPLAINT AND PETITION

Case No. 192490

Date: October 7, 2019 Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept: 8

Judge: Hon. Tamara L. Wood Trial Date: April 14, 2020 Action Filed: May 13, 2019

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13	FRIENDS OF THE RIVER;	PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO
	GOLDEN GATE SALMON ASSOCIATION; PACIFIC COAST FEDERATION OF	DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
14	FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATIONS;	PORTION OF COMPLAINT AND PETITION
15	INSTITUTE FOR FISHERIES RESOURCES; SIERRA CLUB;	
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17	, i	Date: October 7, 2019
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	V.	Judge: Hon. Tamara L. Wood
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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs and Petitioners Friends of the River et al. ("Plaintiffs") properly seek declaratory relief against Defendant Westlands Water District ("Westlands") for its ongoing, illegal actions in support of the Shasta Dam raise project. The California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act ("Act") prohibits agencies like Westlands from assisting or cooperating with planning or construction of any dam raise that could have an adverse effect on the McCloud River, and Plaintiffs seek a judicial declaration that Westlands is currently in violation of this prohibition and barred from undertaking any further actions that constitute assistance or cooperation with the planning or construction of the Shasta Dam raise project. Westlands has moved to strike Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief, but its motion fails because California law is clear that declaratory relief is appropriate where, as here, plaintiffs seek clarification and application of the law against a defendant agency that is violating its legal duties. Further, the California Supreme Court has held that declaratory relief may be paired with other forms of relief, including traditional writs of mandate. This Court should accordingly deny Westlands' motion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act prohibits agencies of the state, like Westlands, from assisting or cooperating with the planning or construction of any dam or reservoir that could have an adverse effect on the McCloud River's free-flowing conditions or its wild trout fishery. (Pub. Resources Code, § 5093.542, subd. (c).)

On May 13, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 and for injunctive relief pursuant to sections 525 and 526, along with a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to section 1085. Plaintiffs challenge Westlands' unlawful assistance and cooperation with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's ("Reclamation") efforts to raise Shasta Dam and enlarge Shasta Reservoir (the "Shasta Dam raise project"). Westlands has admitted to at least three acts of assistance and cooperation: Westlands is undertaking and funding review for the proposed Shasta Dam raise project under the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"), and has authorized a total of \$1,020,000 for this purpose; Westlands has been negotiating the terms of a potential cost-share agreement with Reclamation; and, in 2007, Westlands purchased the

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Bollibokka Fishing Club located on the banks of the McCloud River "to facilitate the raising of Shasta Dam by the U.S. Department of the Interior." (See Westlands' Mem. in Support of Motion to Transfer Action from Shasta County to Fresno County at pp. 5:25-27, 9:10-12; Westlands' Reply to Friends of the River et al.'s Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Transfer Action at p. 7:1-2 (hereafter "Westlands' Venue Reply").)

ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs properly seek a declaration from this Court that Westlands' ongoing, unlawful acts of assistance and cooperation in the planning of the Shasta Dam raise project violate the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. California courts regularly review claims for declaratory relief when, as here, it is alleged that an agency is violating applicable law. Further, it is proper to file a combined pleading including both a complaint for declaratory relief and a petition of writ of mandate as Plaintiffs have done here. Westlands' argument that Plaintiffs may only proceed with a petition for writ of mandate—to the exclusion of declaratory relief—is meritless and disproven by the two cases on which it bases its motion.

I. Plaintiffs properly seek declaratory relief to address Westlands' duties under the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and Westlands' violations of those duties.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 states that a party "may ask for a declaration of rights or duties, either alone or with other relief; and the court may make a binding declaration of these rights or duties." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) "Declaratory relief is appropriate to obtain judicial clarification of the parties' rights and obligations under applicable law. [Citations.]" (Californians for Native Salmon and Steelhead Assn. v. Dept. of Forestry (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1419, 1427.)

Courts frequently offer such "judicial clarification" of rights and obligations to address "an actual controversy over ... [an agency's] legally-mandated duties." (Ibid.) For example, in Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1566, the court ruled that declaratory relief was proper "to resolve the [agency's] fundamental misunderstanding of its responsibilities under the [law] and to avoid continued violations or nonenforcement in the future." Likewise, in Walker v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 55 Cal.2d 626, 636-37, the California Supreme

Court held that a claim for declaratory relief was proper to settle whether a county board of supervisors was required to follow certain procedures when setting wages for county workers.

Consistent with Code of Civil Procedure section 1060, Plaintiffs properly seek declaratory relief to address Westlands' duties under the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. The Act prohibits assistance or cooperation with planning or construction of any dam or reservoir that could adversely affect the McCloud River's free flow or wild trout fishery. (Pub. Resources Code, § 5093.542, subd. (c).) Here, even though federal and state authorities have already determined that the Shasta Dam raise project will or could adversely affect free flow and wild trout, Westlands has been assisting and cooperating with planning and construction for the project by funding and commencing CEQA planning activities, engaging in cost share negotiations, and purchasing riverside property. Westlands argues that these activities are not barred by the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (see Westlands' Mem. in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Case No. 192487, p. 13:13-14:3; Westlands' Venue Reply, pp. 6:23-7:6)—thereby confirming that Plaintiffs properly have alleged "an actual controversy over ... [Westlands'] legally-mandated duties" that this Court can and should decide via declaratory relief. (Californians for Native Salmon, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1427.)

Additional considerations underscore that Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief against Westlands for violations of the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act is proper. First, this case presents issues of first impression under the McCloud River provisions of the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, and "[a] controversy over an interpretation of a statute, and the duties that statute imposes, is a proper basis for a declaratory relief claim." (*Redwood Coast Watersheds Alliance v. State Bd. of Forestry and Fire Protection* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 962, 969.) Indeed, "[i]t is elementary that the interpretation of ordinances and statutes is a proper matter for declaratory relief." (*City of San Joaquin v. State Bd. of Equalization* (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 365, 374.)

Second, although Westlands argues that the Court should ignore its various ongoing acts of assistance and cooperation and await a final administrative decision by Westlands to fund the Shasta Dam raise project, such final agency action is not a prerequisite for declaratory relief. On its face, the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act requires no such final action; it broadly prohibits even

merely "assist[ing] or cooperat[ing] ... in the planning or construction of any dam [or] reservoir." (Pub. Resources Code, § 5093.542, subd. (c).) In any event, even if the Act's protections for the McCloud River were not so expansive, courts are empowered to address agency action prospectively before the agency reaches a final determination. "Declaratory relief is an equitable remedy and is unusual in that it may be brought to determine and declare rights before any actual invasion of those rights has occurred." (*Californians for Native Salmon, supra,* 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1426, internal citations and quotation omitted.) Courts may thus grant declaratory relief "in order to liquidate uncertainties and controversies which might result in future litigation especially where the interpretation of a statute is the subject of the dispute." (*In re Claudia E.* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 627, 635.) "Additionally, judicial economy strongly supports the use of declaratory relief to avoid duplicative actions to challenge an agency's statutory interpretation or alleged policies." (*Ibid.*)

II. Plaintiffs are entitled to seek both declaratory relief and a writ of mandate.

Declaratory relief is authorized under section 1060 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and section 1062 specifies that declaratory relief is a "cumulative" remedy. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1060, 1062.) Consequently, the California Supreme Court has stated that declaratory relief "may be asked alone or with other relief." (*Columbia Pictures Corp. v. De Toth* (1945) 26 Cal.2d 753, 761.) The availability of alternative remedies against an agency or agency officials—including petition for writ of mandate—does not bar a plaintiff from seeking declaratory relief. (See, e.g., *Steinberg v. Chiang* (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 338, 344 ["Availability of an alternative remedy, such as mandate ... is not generally a basis for denial of declaratory relief"].)

Because declaratory relief is a cumulative remedy, plaintiffs challenging the lawfulness of agency actions commonly seek it in conjunction with a petition for writ of mandate, and this combination is readily accepted by the courts including the California Supreme Court. For example, in *California Building Industry Association v. Bay Area Air Quality Management District* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1088, the court remanded a CEQA case to the trial court with instructions to both issue a writ of mandate and to consider a related claim for declaratory relief. Similarly, in *Venice Town Council*, *supra*, the court ruled that while appellants' claim for declaratory relief against the defendant city was "potentially cumulative to their right to traditional mandate," the stated

allegations were "sufficient to entitle appellants to declaratory relief." (47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1565.)

And in *Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 735-36, 746, 764-65, the

California Supreme Court described the trial court's judgment on "causes of action for a writ of mandate, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief" and affirmed a judgment that both resolved legal issues via judicial declaration and ordered issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate that directed the defendant county to reconsider a permit application in light of the court's clarification of the law.

(See also *Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Super. Ct.* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 566 [noting without objection that plaintiff "brought an action in superior court seeking both declaratory and mandamus relief" against state Air Resources Board].)

Consistent with the foregoing authority and common practice, Plaintiffs in this case properly seek both declaratory relief and a writ of mandate to address Westlands' ongoing assistance and cooperation in planning for the Shasta Dam raise project in violation of the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.¹

III. Neither City of Pasadena nor CalPERS preclude Plaintiffs from seeking declaratory relief in this case.

In a failed attempt to sidestep the foregoing dispositive authority establishing that Plaintiffs are entitled to seek declaratory relief and a petition for writ of mandate, Westlands misrepresents the holdings from two cases—*City of Pasadena v. Cohen* (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1461 and *Public Employees' Retirement System v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority* (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1040 (hereafter "*CalPERS*"). Westlands erroneously claims these two cases hold that declaratory relief (1) is unavailable for review of all types of agency action and (2) may not be joined with a writ of mandate reviewing an administrative determination. (Westlands' Mem. in

¹ Indeed, Westlands itself recently filed a claim for declaratory relief coupled with a petition for writ of mandate in a Fresno County Superior Court challenge to a decision made by the State Water Resources Control Board. (See Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. 1 [Westlands Complaint in Fresno County Case No. 19CECG00165].) As indicated by those pleadings, Westlands is represented in that case by the same counsel of record as this case. During the parties' August 16, 2019 meet-and-confer call regarding Westlands' motion to strike, counsel for Plaintiffs raised Westlands' conflicting positions with Westlands' counsel. On August 19, 2019, counsel for Plaintiffs sent to Westlands' counsel a copy of Westlands' combined petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief in its Fresno County Superior Court case.

Support of Motion to Strike, pp. 6:4-28, 7:1-7.) Not so. The holdings of *City of Pasadena* and *CalPERS* are much narrower and only apply to specific circumstances that are not present in the immediate case.

In *City of Pasadena*, the Third District reviewed a preliminary injunction granted to the plaintiff city in a declaratory relief claim against a city-specific "administrative determination" made by the state Department of Finance. (228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1463-64.) The court vacated the preliminary injunction, ruling that the city could not proceed via a claim for declaratory relief and must seek a writ of mandate instead. (*Id.* at pp. 1466-68.) The decision, however, did *not* establish a general prohibition against declaratory relief for any and all challenges to agency action. To the contrary, as the Third District subsequently explained in *CalPERS*, its *City of Pasadena* decision "relied on authority that found declaratory relief inappropriate where it challenges an administrative agency's *application of legal principles to a party*." (23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1045, italics added.) As fully explained by the *CalPERS* decision, declaratory relief against an agency is only barred where a plaintiff attempts to collaterally attack "adjudicative acts in specific cases" or certain administrative proceedings commenced to develop agency policy "that is to be applied in pending cases" (*Id.* at p. 1046, italics and citations omitted.) Based on this specific rule, the *CalPERS* decision disallowed a claim for declaratory relief that would have disrupted transit workers' pending adjudicative appeals before the CalPERS board. (*Id.* at pp. 1042-43, 1045-46.)

Significantly, in describing the scope of its ruling, the *CalPERS* court was careful to distinguish—and emphasized that it was not disturbing—cases like *Californians for Native Salmon* and *Venice Town Council* that authorized declaratory relief against agencies that "refus[ed] to apply governing law." (23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1046.)

City of Pasadena and CalPERS therefore offer no support to Westlands' motion to strike and, in fact, confirm that Plaintiffs properly seek declaratory relief in this case. City of Pasadena and CalPERS prohibit claims for declaratory relief only when a plaintiff seeks to challenge an "agency's application of legal principles to a party." (CalPERS, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1045.) Here, Westlands has not commenced any adjudicative process pursuant to the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act; no such adjudicative process exists under the Act; and the Act does not otherwise

authorize Westlands to interpret or apply the Act. Rather, it is the role of the Court in this case to interpret and apply the Act and to address any violations thereof. California courts, including the CalPERS court, have repeatedly confirmed that a claim for declaratory relief is a proper way to construe a statute like the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and to resolve allegations that an agency like Westlands has refused to follow the law. (CalPERS, at p. 1046; accord Walker, supra, 55 Cal.2d at pp. 636-37; Californians for Native Salmon, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 1427; Venice Town Council, supra, 47 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1566.) Because Westlands has failed to identify any relevant legal authority that supports its position, its motion to strike Plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief must be denied.

CONCLUSION

As set forth above, Plaintiffs properly seek a declaration from this Court that Westlands' ongoing acts of assistance and cooperation in the planning of the Shasta Dam raise project violate the California Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. A claim for declaratory relief is proper when, as here, plaintiffs allege that an agency is violating applicable law. Further, case law including California Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that it is both proper and common for plaintiffs to file a combined complaint for declaratory relief and petition for writ of mandate. Westlands' argument that Plaintiffs may only proceed with a writ petition, to the exclusion of declaratory relief, is not even supported by the only two cases it cites to support its motion—and indeed conflicts with Westlands' own combined petition and complaint in another recently filed case against a state agency. For these reasons, this Court should deny Westlands' motion to strike those portions of Plaintiffs' complaint and petition that seek declaratory relief.

DATED: September 24, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

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1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 I am a citizen of the United States of America and a resident of the City and County of San 3 Francisco; I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within entitled action; my business 4 address is 50 California Street, Suite 500, San Francisco, California. 5 I hereby certify that on September 24, 2019, I caused to be served the document herein (Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike Portion of Complaint and Petition) on 6 7 the parties listed below via same-day delivery: Daniel J. O'Hanlon 8 Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard 400 Capitol Mall, 27th Floor 9 Sacramento, CA 95814 dohanlon@kmtg.com 10 Andrea A. Matarazzo 11 Pioneer Law Group, LLP 1122 S Street 12 Sacramento, CA 95811 andrea@pioneerlawgroup.net 13 Jon D. Rubin 14 Westlands Water District 400 Capitol Mall, 28th Floor 15 Sacramento, CA 95814 jrubin@wwd.ca.gov 16 17 I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on 18 September 24, 2019 in San Francisco, California. 19 W. Wal 20 John W. Wall 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

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